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I. INTRODUCTION
{1} America Online, Inc. (“AOL”) and Time Warner Inc. announced their intention to merge on
January 10, 2000.1 At that time, there was a great deal of excitement about combining these two
companies and harnessing the power of an increasingly broadband Internet. In addition to the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”) and Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), more than one
thousand local communities conducted their own reviews of the merger.2 The FTC identified “open
access” to the Time Warner Cable platform as an issue meriting specific relief.3
{2} The FCC, for its part, specifically identified “instant messaging” (“IM”) as an issue to be
addressed by means of a merger condition.4 The FCC restricted the merged company’s ability to offer
advanced interactive high-speed IM services over its facilities (the “IM condition”) in connection
with its approval of the merger.5 This article reviews the genesis of the IM condition and AOL Time
Warner’s (“Time Warner” or “AOL Time Warner”)6 successful effort to have the condition lifted.
Part II explains the FCC’s rationale for imposing the IM condition. Part III describes Time Warner’s
arguments in support of lifting the IM condition. Part IV describes the FCC’s decision to lift the IM
condition, and Part V sets forth additional reasons why the IM condition should have been lifted. A
brief conclusion follows.
II. THE FCC REGULATES INSTANT MESSAGING
{3} Instant messaging enables “the almost instantaneous exchange of short, private, individualized
text messages over the Internet between two users who are online simultaneously . . . .”7 IM is a
tool that allows users to detect the presence of their online “buddies.”8 This is made possible by the
provider’s directory of user names and presences, or so-called “NPD.”9 The NPD enables users to
determine when others are online or available.10 The actual NPD consists of (1) a database of the
user’s unique IM names and addresses and (2) a “presence detection” function that informs users that
others are online and available to engage in instant messaging.11 After its invention and popularization
by AOL, IM became popular in the late 1990s, as hundreds of millions of Internet users discovered
how its features could make communication easier and more efficient.12
{4} The IM condition was premised on the FCC’s assumption that AOL was “dominant” in the
provision of text-based IM services and that this “dominance” would not only persist but grow.13
Specifically, the FCC feared that AOL would be able to leverage its position in an anti-competitive
manner into so-called “advanced interactive high speed” IM services (or “AIHS”).14 In particular,
the FCC predicted that (1) this new category of services would emerge15 and (2) those services
would build upon existing text-based IM offerings – and, more specifically, their NPDs.16 These
assumptions, combined with the conclusion that “NPD services exhibit strong network effects,”17
placed critical significance on AOL’s share of text-based IM at that time.18
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{5} During the merger review proceeding, AOL’s IM rivals claimed that AOL enjoyed an 80-90%
share of IM users.19 AOL submitted data showing its share of IM users was approximately 65%.20
Without relying on any specific data or methodology, the FCC concluded that “AOL, by any measure
described in the record, is the dominant IM provider in America.”21 It also found that “the IM business
is not competitive”22 and that AOL would dominate NPD-based services for the foreseeable future.23
{6} Based on these assumptions, the FCC concluded that AOL’s NPD would “further swell” while its
competitors’ would “shrink.”24 This prediction served as the very foundation of the IM condition:
The Majority essentially employs a market “tipping” analysis in an effort to make this case,
attempting to demonstrate that the IM market has nearly tipped, or will tip when AOL
combines with Time Warner. The Majority avers, however, that it expresses no opinion on
whether its conclusions can be read as a finding the market has tipped . . . . Whatever the
semantics of its conclusions, the Majority’s market tipping analysis is a critical analytical
underpinning for the IM condition.25
In other words, the FCC concluded that AOL was the largest IM provider and that NPDs exhibit strong
network effects.26 This led the FCC to make two predictions.
{7} First, the FCC predicted that network effects would enable AOL to enjoy an enormous advantage
over actual or potential rival AIHS providers absent interoperability.27 In other words, a “typical new
user”28 would choose AOL – the service with the largest NPD – simply because it had the largest NPD
and without regard to other indicia of product quality. Second, the FCC predicted that AOL’s then
“dominant” and likely growing share of text-based IM services would confer on AOL a “first mover
advantage” in streaming video AIHS.29 Thus – simply because AOL had generated the largest NPD
with its text-based IM services – AOL would be the unrivaled leader in deciding which AIHS to roll
out and when.
{8} The IM condition was therefore premised upon an interrelated chain of conclusions and
predictions: first, that AOL was the dominant provider of IM services and, absent interoperability,
the “strong ‘network effects’” associated with IM would cause AOL’s unassailable lead in text-based
IM to “swell” over time; second, that AOL’s dominance in text-based IM would afford the merged
company an anti-competitive first-mover advantage in streaming video AIHS, creating barriers to
entry and foreclosing competition; and third, that a sizeable NPD is an “essential input” for AIHS, and
that no other competitor could attract a sufficiently large NPD so as to provide competition to AOL in
the anticipated marketplace for AIHS.
{9} This reasoning also reflected a great deal of speculation about how text-based IM services – and
yet-to-be implemented AIHS services – would develop in the future.30 Relying on these predictions,
the FCC concluded that AOL would have the incentive and ability to stifle competition and innovation
in future streaming video AIHS applications.31 The IM condition was imposed to prevent the merger
from causing or contributing to these outcomes.32
III. AOL TIME WARNER PETITIONS FOR RELIEF
{10} On April 2, 2003, AOL Time Warner filed a petition seeking relief from the IM condition.33 The
petition argued that there was clear and convincing evidence that maintaining the restrictions on the
merged company no longer served the “public interest, convenience and necessity,” as follows:
•

Based on share data, share trends and other competitive conditions, AOL was not
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dominant in the provision of IM services and there was no danger of “network effects”
causing AOL’s share to “swell;”
• As Microsoft and Yahoo! each independently introduced streaming video AIHS, AOL
could not have – or obtain – a “first mover” advantage in this area; and
• By bundling Windows Messenger and Passport into Windows XP, in addition to
offering its popular stand-alone MSN Messenger service, Microsoft has on its own
become a significant competitor in IM- and presence-enabled services.34
{11} Given these material changes, AOL Time Warner argued that there was clear and convincing
evidence that the IM condition was no longer necessary to protect the public interest from the
purported harms the In re Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and
Section 214 Authorizations by Time Warner, Inc. and America Online, Inc. to AOL Tome Warner,
Inc., Transferee (“Order”) sought to address.35 To the contrary, this restraint on AOL’s provision
of streaming video AIHS now harmed the public interest by negatively affecting investment and
innovation.36 Continued application of the IM condition would serve only to deprive consumers of the
benefits of competition – namely, increased innovation and choice. The petition argued that when a
merger condition that was intended to protect competition instead turns out to burden innovation and
reduce competition, it should be lifted.37
A. The Facts Showed AOL Was Not “Dominant” in IM.
{12} The petition showed that AOL was not “dominant” in the delivery of IM under any measure.
In the more than two years since the Order was adopted, IM services have continued to rapidly
develop and become more competitive. In fact, the petition demonstrated how AOL’s “share” of IM
users declined while its competitors’ shares have grown. As a result, and contrary to the FCC’s own
predictions, AOL was not “dominant” in the provision of IM or any related NPD-based service when
it filed its petition. Specifically, AOL faced increasingly stiff competition from Microsoft’s MSN
Messenger, Yahoo! Messenger, and a number of smaller IM providers. The Order invited AOL, when
petitioning to lift the IM condition, to provide evidence that it has not been a “dominant provider” of
NPD-based services for four consecutive months.38 To this end, data compiled by comScore Media
Metrix (“Media Metrix”), the leading Internet audience measurement service in North America,39
showed that AOL’s two major competitors, Microsoft and Yahoo!, had averaged 22.2% and 19.3%,
respectively, of the share of IM users per month during the four months prior to the filing of the
petition.40 For its part, AOL had averaged 58.5% share of IM users each month during this time.41 In
contrast, as recently as June 1999, AOL’s share of text-based IM was virtually 100%; is because AOL’s
distinct products – AOL IM, AIM and ICQ – were the only significant IM offerings available at that
time.42 The long term trends indicate healthy competition among IM providers.
{13} Media Metrix data also showed that AOL’s rivals have seen continued growth in the number
of Unique Visitors to their IM services: MSN Messenger’s number of Unique Visitors increased
from 17,640,000 in October 2002 to 19,410,000 in February 2003 (a 10% increase), while Yahoo!
Messenger’s Unique Visitors increased from 16,138,000 to 16,802,000 (a 4% increase).43 In
comparison, AOL’s unduplicated Unique Visitors decreased from 52,120,000 in October 2002 to
50,965,000 in February 2003 (a 2% decrease).44
B. There Was No Legal Basis For Finding AOL to be “Dominant” in IM.
{14} AOL’s declining share of IM and the existence of two strong competitors provided further
support for concluding that it was not “dominant” in IM. Beginning in 1980 with In re Policy and
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Rules Concerning Rates Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations Therefor
(“Dominant/Non-Dominant First Report and Order”),45 “dominance” in communications markets
has been directly equated with market power.46 Market power, according to the FCC, is the ability
to profitably set prices above competitive levels, effectively lower prices to forestall entry by new
competitors or eliminate existing competitors.47 The relevant indicia of market power (or the lack
thereof) include the number and size of competing firms, the nature of barriers to entry, the availability
of reasonably substitutable services, and the control of bottleneck facilities,48 as well as elasticities of
supply and demand.49 A declining market share may also indicate the absence of market power.50
{15} These “dominance” criteria were initially developed to determine which sectors of the
telecommunications market were competitive and “non-dominant” and should therefore be
deregulated.51 The dominant firms at that time included AT&T and its local telephone companies,
as they “control[led] access to over 80% of the nation’s telephones” and thereby controlled a
bottleneck facility essential to competitors.52 In contrast, the firms that the FCC found to be nondominant included “specialized common carriers” (“SCCs”), such as MCI and Southern Pacific
Communications Company (the forerunner to Sprint). SCCs were found to be non-dominant since
they, unlike AT&T, “always face[d] a direct competitor that offer[ed] a readily substitutable service.”53
Any attempt by a non-dominant firm to exercise market power would quickly be “frustrated” by its
competitors.54
{16} In 1995, the FCC applied these criteria to AT&T’s motion to be classified as non-dominant in the
market for interexchange carrier (“IXC”) services.55 The FCC found that AT&T was not a dominant
firm with a 58.6% share of the IXC market56 where supply and demand was sufficiently elastic to
constrain AT&T’s ability to raise prices unilaterally.57 The fact that AT&T’s market share had steadily
declined from 90%, and that it faced competition from at least two strong competitors, confirmed that
it lacked market power.58 Applying these precedents, it was clear that AOL’s IM services were not
“dominant.”
{17} First, Media Metrix share data showed that AOL was not dominant in IM.59 In the AT&T
proceeding, the FCC noted that in the ten-year period from 1984 to 1994, AT&T’s market share in
long distance telephone service fell from 90% to 58.6%.60 The FCC found that “the decline in AT&T’s
market share suggests that AT&T no longer possesses market power.”61 Only two years after imposing
the IM condition, the FCC was faced with even more compelling facts with respect to IM. Since June
1999, when AOL served 100% of IM users, AOL has confronted two major new IM entrants, Yahoo!
and Microsoft, as well as numerous smaller entrants. As a result, AOL had experienced a substantial
decline in its IM share. Its share of unduplicated all location users had fallen from 100% to 58.5% in
just three and one-half years.62
{18} These numbers provided significant evidence of “changed circumstances” with key implications
for purposes of the FCC’s analysis of the petition.63 First, AOL’s IM share had fallen more rapidly
than did AT&T’s long-distance share during the period preceding the FCC’s determination that AT&T
was non-dominant. At the time of its petition, AOL’s share in IM was approximately the same as
AT&T’s share in long distance when the FCC determined that AT&T was not dominant.
{19} Second, high demand elasticity further showed that AOL was not dominant in IM. In the AT&T
proceeding, the FCC found that demand for AT&T’s long distance service was extremely price elastic.
As such, the FCC noted that there was reason to believe that many customers “will switch to or from
AT&T in order to obtain price reductions.”64 The FCC also noted that 20% of AT&T’s residential
customers changed interexchange carriers at least once a year.65 The two years preceding AOL’s
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petition showed that IM providers face similarly high levels of demand elasticity because nothing
prevents IM users from downloading and using multiple instant messenger clients, essentially without
cost.66 Over time, consumers’ propensity to choose alternative providers has been demonstrated by the
growth of Microsoft and Yahoo! as IM providers and the new video AIHS services that are offered by
both Microsoft and Yahoo!. The ability of consumers today to defeat an attempted price increase by
easily shifting to established, branded, powerful rivals – such as Microsoft and Yahoo! – is no longer
a theoretical possibility but is a materially changed circumstance that further confirms the lack of
dominance by AOL.
{20} Third, high supply elasticity showed that AOL was not dominant in IM. In the AT&T nondominance proceeding, the FCC found that “AT&T’s competitors have enough readily available
excess capacity to constrain AT&T’s pricing behavior,”67 meaning that “supply is sufficiently elastic
to constrain AT&T’s unilateral pricing decisions.”68 More than two years after the IM condition was
imposed, it was clear that Microsoft and Yahoo! faced no capacity constraint that would prevent them
from rapidly expanding their NPDs in response to increased customer demand for their services (or
reduced willingness to pay for AOL’s). Nor was there any reason to believe that either of AOL’s major
competitors would be unable to increase their server capacity or other IM infrastructure to support
such surges in demand. These conclusions were consistent with the continued growth in the number
of new users of Yahoo! Messenger and MSN Messenger, observed facts that have become clear since
the Order was adopted.69 According to Media Metrix data, from October 2002 to February 2003,
MSN Messenger’s number of Unique Visitors grew by almost two million and Yahoo! Messenger’s
Unique Visitors grew over the same period by more than half a million.70 There is no evidence that
suggests that either firm’s resources were threatened by these increases.
{21}Fourth, there was no evidence that Time Warner’s efficiency, financial strength or size would
today or in the future convey upon it the ability to increase prices or reduce output in IM. In the AT&T
proceedings, the FCC considered AT&T’s cost structure, size, and financial resources to determine
whether or not these factors gave AT&T the ability to price anticompetitively. The FCC did not find
that AT&T’s size or financial resources would allow it to unilaterally increase prices above competitive
levels. There was likewise no reason to believe that AOL Time Warner was in any different situation
or that it was financially stronger than its largest IM rival, Microsoft. There was also no reason to
believe that Yahoo!, AOL’s next largest rival, lacked the resources necessary to compete effectively.
{22} In summary, although the Motion of AT&T Corp. to be Reclassified as a Non-Dominant Carrier
(“AT&T Non-Dominance”) proceeding and the current proceeding occurred at different times and
involved different services, the criteria for a finding of dominance used by the FCC in its analysis of
AT&T could be directly applied to AOL Time Warner. Those criteria indicate that – due to a series of
material changes – there was no legal basis to conclude that AOL is dominant in IM or that it threatens
to become so in the future.
C. There Was No Economic Basis for Concluding AOL Was “Dominant” in IM.
{23} Along with its petition, AOL Time Warner also submitted the expert affidavit of Professor
William P. Rogerson which demonstrated that there is no economic basis to conclude that AOL is
dominant in IM or that network effects have led or will lead IM to “tip” in AOL’s favor.71 To the
contrary, Professor Rogerson concluded that there was “clear and convincing evidence that there are
three strong and stable competitors” in IM and no “plausible reason to conclude either that AOL is
dominant or that the market has ‘tipped’ or is in danger of ‘tipping’ to AOL.”72 Professor Rogerson
based his conclusion on the fact that AOL’s share of IM has “continued to decline while the shares of
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its two competitors, Microsoft and Yahoo!, have continued to grow.”73 As Professor Rogerson pointed
out, the evidence shows that “competition is strong and vibrant” in IM.74
{24} Professor Rogerson made two compelling arguments to support his conclusion. First, he noted
that AOL’s share of IM has been decreasing ever since Microsoft and Yahoo! began to compete
with AOL. Professor Rogerson examined AOL’s chief competitors and found there was no reason
to conclude they were weak or unstable or that their shares of IM were likely to decline. For these
reasons, he concluded there was strong evidence that “the market has not ‘tipped’ [to AOL and that it]
is in no danger of ‘tipping’ to AOL” in the future.75 Second, Professor Rogerson found clear evidence
of competition in IM. Specifically, he noted that competition has kept prices for these offerings at
zero.76 Professor Rogerson also pointed out that AOL does not enjoy any special advantages in IM
due to the size of its NPD. Indeed, Microsoft and Yahoo! have each introduced streaming video
AIHS services ahead of AOL. This provided independent evidence of these competitors’ viability.77
Furthermore, to Professor Rogerson, there was no reason to believe that either of these competitors
were capacity-constrained. Microsoft is pursuing a particularly vigorous strategy by bundling its IM
offering with its monopoly operating system.78 For all of these reasons, there was no economic basis
to conclude that AOL is dominant in IM today or that IM is likely to “tip” to AOL in the future.
D. AOL’s Rivals had Significant and Growing NPDs.
{25} Whatever concerns existed more than two years ago about AOL’s “uniquely large” NPD, there
was no basis for continued concern in this regard either. Microsoft and Yahoo! have each witnessed
substantial growth in their IM user bases. Microsoft’s growth has not been surprising. In addition to
marketing its stand-alone MSN Messenger service, Microsoft has bundled both Windows Messenger,
its new and backward-compatible consumer IM service, and Microsoft .NET Passport (“Passport”)
into Windows XP. In this manner, Microsoft has established its own IM and presence detection
capabilities as the de facto standards for personal computer (“PC”) users. Published reports indicate
that Windows Messenger, the streaming video AIHS-enabled IM client, “loads and runs every time
Windows is booted.”79 A Passport account, meanwhile, not only doubles as a user name for MSN
Messenger, Windows Messenger, and Microsoft’s Hotmail e-mail service,80 it is also “an online service
that makes it possible for you to use your e-mail address and a single password to sign in to any .NET
Passport-participating Web site or service.”81 As a result, Passport’s already substantial user base,
which Microsoft started in March 2002 and included over 200 million users,82 now includes over 270
million users83 and can be expected to enjoy continued growth.84 Indeed, through new PC purchases
(Windows XP is the default operating system on nearly all new Windows-based PCs) and upgrades,
the majority of computer users can soon be expected to be Windows XP users.85 This will provide
clear incentives – to Microsoft, obviously, but more importantly, to third-party developers as well – to
incorporate Microsoft’s IM and presence detection capabilities into future NPD-based services. Such
an advantage will make it difficult for rival providers of such services to compete.86 The bundling of
Windows Messenger and Passport into Windows XP clearly demonstrates that Microsoft is capable of
competing head-to-head with AOL in this evolving arena.
{26} In addition, Yahoo! has designed its network of Internet properties so that all of its eighty-six
million active registered users87 are potential members of its NPD. As Yahoo! notes, “[o]nce you
establish a Yahoo! ID, you will have access to the entire Yahoo! network. You need only do this once
– your ID will work for every service in Yahoo! [including Yahoo! Messenger].”88 Clearly, the number
of Yahoo!’s unique users should be more than sufficient to support its continued rollout of AIHS.
IV. THE COMMISSION’S DECISION
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{27} In reviewing the petition, the FCC focused first on the “trend in . . . [IM] . . . shares,” which
it found to be “inconsistent with the market ‘tipping’ concerns expressed in the Order.”89 First, the
FCC recognized that in a market “subject to tipping,” smaller firms would not continue to grow at the
expense of the largest firm.90 Second, the FCC viewed Microsoft and Yahoo! as “stable competitors
. . . [and] an indication that the market is maturing and stabilizing.”91 As a result, the FCC found it
unlikely that AOL would be able to “control entry or survival in the market.”92
{28} Opponents of lifting the IM condition argued that the fact that many IM users relied on multiple
IM platforms demonstrated that AOL had an effective lock on the market.93 The FCC found to the
contrary: “[I]n those markets . . . where tipping has occurred,” it noted that “consumer[s] typically
purchase[] one product exclusively.”94 The fact that “so many consumers are willing to use multiple
platforms in this case suggests that consumer lock-in is not a concern here.”95 As persuasive evidence
that interoperability was not competitively necessary, the FCC also found the fact that Microsoft and
Yahoo! “have chosen not to interoperate with each other.”96 “These providers,” it noted, “must believe
that the market is competitive and that their own market presence is strong enough for the market to
remain competitive.”97
{29} Finally, and importantly, the FCC recognized that lifting the IM condition would “likely

provide public interest benefits.”98 With the condition removed, AOL would be able to compete more
effectively and offer consumers greater choices in the marketplace.99 With more choices and more
available functions in the various IM platforms, consumers will benefit, whereas with continued AOL
regulation, consumers would not benefit.
V. DIFFICULTIES WITH MANDATORY STANDARD SETTING FOR INSTANT MESSAGING
{30} The IM condition can be seen as a form of mandatory standard-setting imposed by the
government on a new and emerging market or application. Many markets exhibit what economists
refer to as “network effects,” which means essentially that consumers derive more value from that
product as more consumers purchase or use it.100 In connection with IM, the “source” of any such
effects is that people may attribute more value to the application when more people use it because
more users allows each user to communicate with a larger group of people.
{31} Firms in markets with network effects may be able to make their products “compatible” in order
to make it easier for consumers using two different products to share the network, thus enhancing
the “value” of the products to their users. To be sure, there are gains when products like IM are
made compatible. More users find a larger network more useful, and more applications become
available for the installed base of users.101 The absence of compatibility may therefore be detrimental
to consumers.102 It follows that the need to encourage compatibility was the animus behind the IM
condition.
{32} Network effects, however, are not anti-competitive in and of themselves. Importantly, network
effects may create or enhance market power – and thus harm consumers – when they reinforce entry
barriers, thereby insulating existing networks from competition.103 In the case of IM, for example,
there is plainly no evidence of such barriers. Robust competitors to AOL have been able to increase
their user shares and offer innovations on their own. None of the major IM providers have decided to
interoperate with each other. Of course, there are perfectly legitimate reasons for this. It is simply not
the case that all providers are better off interoperating if IM has not “tipped.”
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{33} Industry standards might raise the costs of individual firms’ design decisions. Such standards
may raise costs to some consumers – just as much or more than they may lower costs to others.
Moreover, standards may dampen the incentive to innovate, as firms would be guaranteed mandatory
access to an innovator’s improvements. Not only would market innovators see their potential
benefits decline in such a market, they would be forced to give some of whatever benefits remain
to their competitors. For these reasons, mandatory standards via government regulation may also
harm consumers by dampening competition.104 Indeed, enforcing standards adopted by government
regulation potentially imposes even more costs. The facts plainly showed for IM that there was no
need to impose mandatory compatibility. In the absence of evidence that the failure to interoperate
is part of a concrete strategy to create or raise entry barriers, the burden should be on proponents of
continued regulation to justify continued intervention.
VI. CONCLUSION
{34} The FCC has long recognized that competition stimulates investment and innovation, bringing
increased choice, lower prices, improved service, and new product offerings.105 Competition has the
power to give choices to consumers, and “with more choices, consumers reap the benefits – better
services, greater innovation, and higher technology.”106 By empowering AOL to offer advanced IM
services as well, the FCC acted to benefit consumers.107
{35} At a minimum, unleashing AOL from unnecessary regulation promises to give consumers more
choice with respect to the types of streaming video IM services available today.108 More importantly,
in order to attract users, AOL will have a stronger incentive to develop streaming video IM offerings
that differentiate its products and services from those of its chief rivals. While it is premature to
predict the form and direction of future innovation, consumers are likely to benefit much more in the
absence of IM restrictions on AOL.
__________________________________________________________________________________
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Order ¶ 134. The Order gives an extensive and more detailed description of instant messaging. Id. ¶¶ 134-37.

Bill Michael, Hey, Buddy… Communication Convergence.com (Nov. 5, 2000), at http://www.cconvergence.com/shared/
article/showarticle.jhtml?articleid=8700982. (last visited February 23, 2004).
8

9

Order ¶ 138.

10

Id.

11

Id.

12

Order ¶ 137.

13

Order ¶¶ 129-30.

14

Id.

See, e.g., Order ¶ 140 (“Many new services and applications based on ‘simple text’ IM are being developed . . . . Many
experienced industry observers believe that these services, including AIHS, will be popular.”) (citations omitted).
15

See id. ¶ 145 (“Despite the quantum leap that all these new services represent beyond IM, they are like IM in one
respect. That is, a provider of AIHS depends on its NPD as much as a provider of IM does.” (citation omitted)). The
Majority concluded that an NPD is an “essential input” for IM services. Id. ¶¶ 129, 138; see also id. ¶ 138 n.376 (“An
essential input is a component of a service or product without which the service or product cannot be created and provided
to others.”).
16

17

Id. ¶ 158.

18

Whether IM is a relevant antitrust “market” was neither the focus of the FCC’s inquiry nor of the Petition seeking relief.

19

Letter from Gerard J. Waldron, counsel for Microsoft, Covington & Burling, to Magalie Salas, Secretary, Federal
Communications Commission (Oct. 13, 2000), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_
document=6511959809; see also Letter from Ross Bagully, President and CEO, Tribal Voice, to Magalie Salas, Secretary,
Federal Communications Commission (July 21, 2000), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_
pdf=pdf&id_document=6511458075 (stating in an attachment that AOL has “a commanding 90% share”).
20

Letter from Peter D. Ross, Attorney, Wiley, Rein and Fielding, to Deborah Lathen, Chief, Cable Services Bureau, Federal
Communications Commission (Dec. 9, 2000) at http://www.fcc.gov/mb/aoltw/imletter.pdf.
21

Order ¶ 129 (emphasis added).
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Id. ¶ 149.

23

Id. ¶ 155.

24

Id.

25

Memorandum Opinion and Order, Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses by Time Warner Inc.
and America Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time Warner, Inc., Transferree, No. 00-30, Statement of Commissioner
Michael K. Powell at 4-5 (emphasis added) (on file with Richmond Journal of Law & Technology) [hereinafter Powell
Separate Statement].
26

Order ¶ 175.

27

Id. ¶ 157.

28

Id. ¶ 158.

Id. ¶ 174. See id. ¶ 128 (“AIHS,” a term coined by the FCC, describes a potentially broad range of existing and future
services. Streaming video AIHS, which is what the IM condition prohibits AOL Time Warner from offering over AOL
Time Warner broadband facilities, comprises only a small subset of that broader category.).
29

30

That the FCC was cognizant of the speculative and predictive nature underlying its action is evinced by the language
used throughout its discussion and analysis of the Condition. For example, the Order notes that in an effort to promote
the policies of the Communications Act, the Commission may “plan in advance of foreseeable events instead of waiting to
react to them.” Order ¶ 150 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Similarly, in failing to define with precision a relevant
market for purposes of its IM analysis, the Order relied on the well-established precept that the Commission does not need
“tangible evidence . . . but is permitted to rely on its expertise to make predictive judgments.” Id. ¶ 152 n.421 (internal
quotations omitted) (emphasis added); see also id. ¶ 152 (“A more precise definition of the relevant market is not necessary
here, where the Commission can accurately assess the competitive impact of the merger without such a detailed analysis.”)
(emphasis added). The text of the Order is replete with examples highlighting the FCC’s tacit recognition that the IM
condition was a “best guess” of highly uncertain future events. See, for example, the Order, which states:
IM-based services are relatively new but have shown enormous growth in popularity in recent years . . . .
These features, besides being useful in their own right, are predicted to have vast potential as a
“platform” for the development of additional applications in the future, particularly as users obtain highspeed Internet access.
Id. ¶ 129 n.366 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., id. ¶ 132 (“We then find that the proposed merger would give AOL Time
Warner substantial, and perhaps insurmountable, advantages in providing advanced IM-based services over the highspeed Internet platform.”) (emphasis added); id. ¶ 130 (“Given these findings, the combination [of Time Warner and AOL]
substantially increases the probability that AOL’s dominance in the narrowband text-messaging world will persist in the
world of high-speed interactive services.”) (emphasis added); id. ¶ 188 (“AIHS are novel services, but we and many others
believe that they will be significant in the near future.”) (emphasis added); id. ¶ 184 (“Seeing a foreseeable and likely
danger to competition in AIHS, we can act promptly and with confidence.”) (emphasis added).
31

See Order ¶ 130. The Order also states:
While the merger may well stimulate the development and deployment of new services, if the merger in
fact diminishes competition and consumer choice with respect to advanced “IM-based” services . . . as
we predict, then the merger’s potential stimulation of the development of new services will not guarantee
that consumers will benefit from innovation, price competition, or diversity of choices with respect to
these services.

Id. ¶ 313
See id. ¶ 188 (“To prevent AOL Time Warner, as a result of the proposed merger, from becoming more able or likely to
dominate AIHS, we impose a prophylactic condition.”); see also id. ¶¶ 197, 327 (stating that in addition to the restriction
on the delivery of streaming video AIHS, the FCC also required Time Warner to report regularly on the actions it has taken
to achieve interoperability of its IM offerings and others’ offerings).
32
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See generally Petition in the Matter of Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214
Authorization by Time Warner Inc. and American Online, Inc. Transferors, to AOL Time Warner, Inc., Transferee, at http:
//gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6513982043 (Jan. 25, 2003).
33

34

Id.

35

Id.

Powell Separate Statement, supra note 25, at 11. In his dissent to the Condition, then-Commissioner Powell noted that
“[o]ur actions may very well affect innovation, by restricting AOL’s incentives to innovate, and by favoring competitors,
who can innovate without interoperating with AOL, thus restricting AOL in a market for future services . . . . Rather than
preserving a competitive market, we may do nothing more than tip the market to another player.” Id.
36

See Order ¶ 195 (noting the Commission will remove merger condition if it is no longer necessary in the public interest);
accord In re Application of GTE Corp., Transferor, and Bell Atlantic Corp., Transferee, 16 F.C.C. Rcd. 16915, 16918 ¶ 7
(2001) (noting the Commission will remove merger condition that forecloses competition); In re Application of Ameritech
Corp., Transferor, and SBC Communications, Inc., Transferee, 15 F.C.C. Rcd. 17521, 17523 ¶ 21 (2000).
37

Order ¶ 195. The Affidavit of Professor William P. Rogerson attached to the Petition took a longer term view. See
Affidavit of William P. Rogerson (on file with Richmond Journal of Law & Technology) [hereinafter Rogerson Affidavit].
38

Powell Separate Statement, supra note 25, at 4 (“The most objective data on the record is a study by Media Metrix,
recognized as the world leader in the measurement of Internet and digital media use.”). The Media Metrix data relied upon
herein only track usage of AOL IM, AIM, ICQ, MSN Messenger, and Yahoo! Messenger. If comparable data for other
services were included, AOL’s share, however calculated, presumably would be even lower than the numbers presented
below.
39

Press Release, Yahoo! Messenger and MSN Messenger Service Are Fastest Growing Instant-Messaging Applications in
the U.S., (Nov. 16, 2000) (on file with Richmond Journal of Law & Technology).
40

See id. AOL’s share is based upon the unduplicated number of All Locations (i.e., Home, Work and University) Unique
Visitors within the following three Media Metrix measurement categories: (1) AOL Proprietary Instant Message (which
measures IM usage within the AOL online service); (2) AOL Instant Messenger (“AIM”); and (3) ICQ. “Unduplicated”
data ensures that an individual who uses more than one of AOL’s IM offerings (e.g., the IM feature of the AOL online
service at home and AIM at work, both AIM and ICQ at home, AIM at home and ICQ at work, etc.), but constitutes only
one entry in AOL’s overall NPD, is in fact only counted once. The methodology employed by Media Metrix to measure
IM usage has been refined since the Order was adopted, and is now specifically designed to eliminate “false positives” - i.e., rather than counting as a Unique Visitor every user upon whose computer screen the IM client (or, in the case of the
AOL service, the “Buddy List” and/or message windows) becomes the active window, it counts only those users who send
or receive at least one instant message that month.
41

See Holly M. Sanders, AOL Gets FCC Approval for Video on Instant Messenger, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Aug. 21, 2003, at
http://www.detnews.com/2003/technology/0308/22/technology-249962.htm. IM was invented by AOL in 1985 and first
offered as a feature of the AOL online service in 1989. See Letter from Peter D. Ross, Esq., to Magalie Roman Salas, Sept.
29, 2000 (on file with Richmond Journal of Law & Technology). AOL has been issued United States Patent 6,449,344
covering innovations developed by ICQ. See United States Patent 6,449,344, at http://www.jabber.org/im-patents/patent6499344.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
42

43

Petition of AOL Time Warner Inc. for Relief From the Condition Restricting Streaming Video AIHS, No. 00-30, Aug. 20,
2003, available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-03-193A1.doc.
44

Id.

In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations
Therefor, 85 F.C.C.2d 1 (1980).
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46

Id. ¶¶ 56-61.

Id. ¶ 56. A firm that is not constrained by competition from a sufficient number of existing and potential competitors can
profitably raise price above costs -- or prevent price from falling to costs -- by either directly restraining its own output or
by restraining the output of its competitors. See Rogerson Affidavit, supra note 38, at 12.
47

48

Order ¶¶ 57-58.

Motion of AT&T Corp. to be Reclassified as a Non-Dominant Carrier, 11 F.C.C. Rcd. 3271, 3304 ¶ 57 (1995) (citing
William N. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV L. REV. 937, 945-52 (1981))
[hereinafter referred to as AT&T Non-Dominance Order]; see also Rogerson Affidavit, supra note 38, at 13.
49

In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations
Therefor, 95 F.C.C.2d 554, 562 n.19 (1983).
50

See generally In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities
Authorizations Therefor, 85 F.C.C.2d 1 (1980).
51

52

Id. ¶ 62.

53

Id. ¶¶ 79-81.

54

Id.

55

See AT&T Non-Dominance Order, supra note 49; see also Rogerson Affidavit, supra note 38, at 11-12.

AT&T Non-Dominance Order, supra note 49, ¶ 67. For the last four months, AOL’s share averaged 58.5%. See
Rogerson Affidavit, supra note 38, at 3.
56

57

AT&T Non-Dominance Order, supra note 49, ¶¶ 58, 63.

58

AT&T Non-Dominance Order, supra note 49, ¶¶ 67-72.

59

See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.

60

Id. ¶ 67.

61

AT&T Non-Dominance Order, supra note 49, ¶ 72.

Press Release, Yahoo! Messenger and MSN Messenger Service Are Fastest Growing Instant-Messaging Applications in
the U.S., (Nov. 16, 2000) (on file with Richmond Journal of Law & Technology).
62

The Commission did not state a basis for concluding that AOL was “dominant” in IM. See Order ¶ 129. In light of the
AT&T Non-Dominance Order, however, it would be difficult to argue that the Commission believed AOL’s share of IM
was lower than AT&T’s share when it was declared non-dominant (viz., 58.5%). AOL’s declining share since then provides
clear and convincing evidence that it was not dominant in IM when the petition was filed and that there was no likelihood
of anti-competitive “tipping” in AOL’s favor. See Rogerson Affidavit, supra note 38, at 10-12.
63

64

See AT&T Non-Dominance Order, supra note 49, ¶ 63; see also Rogerson Affidavit, supra note 38, at 11-12.

See AT&T Non-Dominance Order, supra note 49, ¶ 63. The standard economic model of market power postulates that
market power “is a function of both a firm’s marginal cost and the supply and demand elasticities that it faces.” Frank P.
Darr, Converging Media Technologies and Standing at the Federal Communications Commission, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1
(1993) (citing Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Analysis of Market Power, with Some Thoughts About Regulated Industries,
in TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION: MARKET POWER AND COST ALLOCATION ISSUES 65, 71 (John R. Allison & Dennis L.
Thomas eds., 1990); see also Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76
GEO. L.J. 241, 267 (1987) (discussing demand elasticity in terms of the Lerner Index). Elastic demand further constrains a
65
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firm’s ability to profitably price above competitive levels. See generally Krattenmaker, id.
66

Any provider deciding to charge a per use fee for using its IM service would likely rapidly lose a large number of
customers and find demand to be highly price elastic. It is not necessary for all or most users to coordinate a switch to a
less expensive IM network in order to deter AOL from even attempting to exercise market power. The downloading and
storage involved in adopting a new IM service are virtually costless, and multiple IM services can be used simultaneously.
And there is no reason that adoption of a new service must be carried out simultaneously by most or all customers on
different buddy lists. As a result, that price increase would be unprofitable. Accord Powell Separate Statement, supra note
25, at 8 n.19; see also Rogerson Affidavit, supra note 38, at 13.
AT&T Non-Dominance Order, supra note 49, ¶ 58 (quoting In re Competition in the Interstate Interexchange
Marketplace, 6 F.C.C. Rcd. 5880, 5888 (1991)).
67

AT&T Non-Dominance Order, supra note 49, ¶ 58. This criterion comports with basic economic principles. If rivals
cannot increase their capacities in response to a price increase by a leading firm, then that firm has some unilateral ability
to exercise market power.
68

69

See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.

70

Id.

See Rogerson Affidavit, supra note 38. Professor Rogerson also filed a Reply Affidavit in response to comments made on
the record before the FCC.
71

72

Rogerson Affidavit, supra note 38, at 3.

73

Id.

74

Id.

75

Id.

76

According to Professor Rogerson, a firm is capable of exercising market power if it can “increase its profits by raising
price above the competitive price.” Rogerson Affidavit, supra note 38, at 13. Professor Rogerson does not believe AOL
can do exercising market power because, “along with its two competitors, [AOL] makes its IM services available to
consumers for free.” Id.
77

Rogerson Affidavit, supra note 38, at 13-14.

78

Id. at 14.

Microsoft, Using the Task Manager, at http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=%2Fdirectory%2Fworldwide%2
Fen-gb%2Ftask.asp (last visited Jan. 29, 2004) (“There are the programs that make up Windows itself, as well as programs
that start automatically when you turn on your PC, like Windows Messenger.”).
79

See Microsoft, .NET Passport Overview, at http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/ default.asp?url=/TechNet/
prodtechnol/winxppro/proddocs/passport_about.asp (last visited Jan. 26, 2004); Microsoft .NET Passport, .NET Passport
– Directory of Sites, at http://www.passport.net/directory/default.asp (last visited Jan. 19. 2004).
80

Microsoft .NET Passport, Microsoft .NET Passport Q&A, at http://www.passport.net/Consumer/ ConsumerQA.asp (last
visited Jan. 19, 2004).
81

Microsoft, Microsoft .NET Passport for Businesses (Mar. 13, 2003), at http://www.microsoft.com/ net/services/passport/
business.asp (last visited Jan. 19, 2004).
82

83

Cardshow.com, iRevolution Joins Forces with RSA Security to Provide Secure Online Authentication to Microsoft .NET
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Passport (Oct. 11, 200), at http://cardshow.com/esmart/details_rubrique_articles.asp?article=355&rubrique=2.
84

In fact, Bill Gates, Microsoft’s Chairman, stated, “it’s our goal to have virtually everybody who uses the Internet to have
one of these Passport connections.” Dominic Gates, Microsoft Could Hold Passport to Net, INDUSTRY STANDARD.COM, July
3, 2001.
85

Indeed, in its first twelve months of sales alone, consumers purchased over sixty-seven million copies of Windows XP
as the original operating system on new PCs. PR Newswire, Microsoft Announces Record First Quarter Revenue (Oct. 17,
2002), at http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT =105&STORY=/www/story/10-12-2002/0001821989. It
can be safely assumed that this number has grown since October 2002, the last period for which data are available, and that
consumer purchases of Windows XP upgrade software for existing PCs further increase the installed base of Windows XP.
86

Indeed, for these reasons, some experts predict that Microsoft’s IM share will eclipse AOL’s within the next few years.
Kristi Heim, Microsoft to Push Instant Messaging for Business, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 7, 2003), available at http:
//www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/business/ special_packages/ms_antitrust/5335953.htm.
Yahoo!, Yahoo! Facts & Figures, at http://solutions.yahoo.com/advertiser_center/research/ figuresQ4.pdf. (last visited
Jan. 19, 2004).
87

Yahoo!, What is a Yahoo! ID or Yahoo! Account?, at http://help.yahoo.com/help/us/sbc/mesg/mesg-04.html (last visited
Jan. 19, 2004).
88

In re Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations by Time Warner
Inc. and America Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time Warner Inc., Transferee; Petition of AOL Time Warner Inc. for
Relief From the Condition Restricting Streaming Video AIHS, 18 F.C.C. Rcd. 16835 ¶ 6 (2003) [hereinafter Relief Order].
89

90

Id.

91

Id. ¶ 8.
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Id.

93

Id. ¶ 10.
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Id.
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Id.

96

Relief Order, supra note 89, ¶ 11.

97

Id.

98

Id. ¶ 12.

99

Id.

100

In communications networks, these effects come from interconnection or interoperability. For example, a telephone is
more valuable to me if everyone else has a phone that I can access from my phone. See generally A. Douglas Melamed,
Network Industries and Antitrust, Address Before The Federalist Society Symposium on Law and Public Policy:
Competition, Free Markets and the Law, at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/2428.htm (Apr. 10, 1999). In other
instances, network effects arise because, as the number of users of a product or service increases, there is an increase in the
number of complements available in the market for that product or service. See generally Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro,
Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93 (1994). For example, a video game player is more valuable
to a user when it is in a widely used format for which, because it is widely used, a large number of games are produced.
101

See supra note 100 and accompanying text.

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology- Volume X, Issue 3

Fernando R. Laguarda- Unleashing “Instant Messaging” From Regulatory Oversight
102

Network effects can increase “the incentive for, and thus the likelihood of, anticompetitive conduct. The very demandside economies of scale that induce the formation of a network in the first place can serve as barriers to competition against
the network, even by those who might offer a superior alternative.” Melamed, supra note 100, at Part III.A. Indeed,
proponents of the IM condition apparently believed that the absence of compatibility in any “market” with potential for
network effects could be per se evidence of market tipping. See Gerald Faulhaber, Network Effects and Merger Analysis:
Instant Messaging and the AOL-Time Warner Case, 26 TELECOMM. POL’Y 311333 (2002).
See Melamed, supra note 100, at Part III. Competition policy should be concerned about entry barriers because they
“increase the likely duration, and thus the value, of market power or monopoly power and thus reduce efficiency.” Id. at
Part III.A; see also PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES & THEIR APPLICATION ¶
420 (2d ed. 2002) (defining an “entry barrier,” in the conventional antitrust sense, as “any factor that permits firms already
in the market to earn returns above the competitive level while deterring outsiders from entering”).
103

See Constance K. Robinson, Network Effects in Telecommunications Mergers, Address Before the Practicing Law
Institute, at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/3889.htm (Aug. 23, 1999) (“[I]nterconnection or compatibility is not
always the best or the least costly way to achieve network efficiencies.”).
104

See, e.g., In re Implementation of Section 6002(B) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993: Annual Report
and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to Commercial Mobile Services, 18 F.C.C. Rcd. 14783, ¶
13 (rel. Jul. 14, 2003) (noting that enhanced competition benefits consumers directly with increased choice, innovative
service, and new technologies); In re National Systems & Research Co., 17 F.C.C. Rcd. 12011, ¶ 1 (rel. Jun. 28, 2002)
(stating that the benefits of competition for consumers include lower prices, innovation, and additional service options).
105

Health of the Telecommunications Sector: A Perspective from the Commissioners of the Federal Communications
Commission Before The Subcommittee On Telecommunications and The Internet of the House Committee On Energy And
Commerce, 107th Cong. (2003) (statement of Michael J. Copps, Commissioner, Federal Communications Commission)
at http://www.fcc.gov/headlines2003.html; see also Health of the Telecommunications Sector: A Perspective from the
Commissioners of the Federal Communications Commission Before The Subcommittee On Telecommunications and The
Internet of the House Committee On Energy And Commerce, 107th Cong. (2003) (written statement of The Honorable
Jonathan S. Adelstein, Commissioner, Federal Communications Commission) at http://www.fcc.gov/headlines2003.html
(“[C]ompetition can provide strong competitive pressures that will drive down prices, improve services[,] and offer
consumers more choices.”).
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107

The introduction of a third competitor to a market with two existing competitors can have significant benefits for
consumers. See, e.g., In re Amendment of the Commission’s Space Station Licensing Rules and Policies; Mitigation of
Orbital Debris, 18 F.C.C. Rcd. 10760, ¶ 64 (rel. May 19, 2003) (discussing benefits of a 3-firm market and presumption
against 3-2 mergers); In re Implementation of Section 6002(B) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993: Annual
Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to Commercial Mobile Services, 18 F.C.C. Rcd.
14783 (rel. Jul. 14, 2003) (separate statement of Chairman Michael K. Powell) (noting that with “three or more choices” in
wireless providers, consumers benefit from “lower . . . prices and more innovative services”).
As mentioned above, choice for consumers is the ultimate benefit of competition. See William Kennard, Chairman,
Federal Communications Commission, Remarks to the Practicing Law Institute, at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/
spwek702.html (Dec. 11, 1997) (“Our job at the FCC is to break down barriers to choice.”).
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